A large number of pairs of countries exhibit a dynamic pattern in which: (i) Fertility in both countries declines across time; (ii) Initially one country has higher fertility and lower per-capita income compared to the other; (iii) In time, as per-capita income converges, fertility rates in the poorer country become lower than in the richer one.
Introduction
In 1965 the output per capita ratio between Spain and the UK was 0.463. By the year 2000 this ratio rose to 0.807. A switch of the "Fertility Dominance" between these two countries accompanied this convergence: The World Bank data show that until 1984 the total fertility rate (TFR) in Spain was higher than in the UK, but since then the TFR in the UK exceeds that of Spain. Since fertility in both countries has been mostly decreasing since the 1960s -the resulting dynamics display the following "Backslanted X" shape. More World Bank data, analyzed in detail in section 2 of this paper, show that such a joint output and fertility dynamics can be found among a substantial number of pairs of countries. In this paper I show how a single factor can be responsible for the three different components of these "Backslanted X" fertility dynamics in which:
Fertility in both countries A and B declines across time; initially A has a higher fertility and lower output per capita than B; later, fertility in A becomes lower in B as output converges. Specifically, this factor is that the individuals in A have a stronger preference for consumption, rather than for rearing and educating children, compared to their counterparts in B.
Although the endogenous growth literature offers many articles trying to account for the observed fertility dynamics, the "Backslanted X" fertility dynamics has not been noticed by this literature yet.
1,2 The utter majority of the growth literature theoretical articles predict a negative link across time between fertility rates and percapita output. 3 Therefore, these articles can account for the "Backslanted X" fertility dynamics only if they assume, as done in the current paper, cross country differences in model parameters, rather than in initial conditions.
In the theoretical model developed in this paper the co-existence of endogenous consumption, investment and fertility severely limits the ability to analyze in detail the transition towards the steady state, which is an essential part of the Backslanted X dynamics. 4 Thus, several simplifying assumptions are taken in the current model, making the accumulation of human capital the sole source of growth.
This growth process is gradual since acquiring education is assumed costly, where the 1 For theoretical articles that study the dynamics of fertility treating it as an endogenous variable and analyzing its dynamics within a dynamic macroeconomic framework see for example Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) , Weil (1996, 2000) , Galor and Moav (2002) and Moav (2004) . 2 Several studies have come near the "Backslanted X" fertility dynamics when dealing with the reversal of the relationship between fertility and female labor participation among OECD countries. This relation was negative until the beginning of the 1980s but has turned positive since. See for example Del Boca (2002) , Adserà (2004) and Apps and Rees (2004) . Some of these studies merely document this reversal and others also provide explanations for the recent positive link, but none of them tries to explain the transition from the previous negative link to the current positive one. 3 Several article, e.g., Galor and Weil (2000) do find that that income effects may generate a positive link between per-capita output and fertility. This positive relation, however, is limited to the early stages of growth and, therefore, is not relevant to the current paper. 4 See for example Barro and Becker (1989) who study the large country case, unlike the simpler case analyzed here, and restrict themselves therefore to an analysis of the dynamics around the steady state.
total cost of education increases with the amount of education acquired. Following Galor and Weil (1996) I assume that the cost of rearing children is increasing in the parent's income. This assumption makes the fertility rates decline as the economies grow. It is also assumed that individuals derive utility from consumption, from the number of children they have and from the future welfare of these children, which depends on their education. Assuming the individuals in countries A and B differ, ceteris paribus, in the degree of the substitution in utility between current family consumption and offspring future welfare, generates the dynamics described above.
Its weaker preference for consumption implies that country B has a stronger preference for investing in children education, which makes it grow faster than A.
Therefore, in the initial stages of growth the individuals in the richer economy B choose to have fewer children, compared to country A individuals. Later in time, as incomes in country A gradually catch up with those in B, the effect that the income differences exert on fertility decrease. At this stage the dominant effect on the fertility ranking is the country A individuals' stronger preference for consumption.
Since the paper focuses on the fertility dynamics of the last few decades, the relevant growth in education for most OECD and middle income countries is the growth in secondary and tertiary education. Hazan and Berdugo (2002) , the current paper is not aiming at generating multiple steady state equilibria and therefore certain simplifications were inserted here into their model. In section 4 the model's implications for the dynamics of cross-country fertility differences is analyzed and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Statistics on the Dynamics of Cross-Country Fertility Differences
In order to learn about the prevalence of this type of fertility dynamics some data were collected for the fifty countries with the highest per-capita gdp in 1975 among the countries for which the World Bank provides fertility and output data for both 1975
and 2000. Countries with population less than 100,000 were taken out of the sample.
In all of the countries in the sample, except for the USA, fertility, measured by the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has decreased over that period. Table 2 To show how unique is this mobility in the fertility ranking Tables 3, 4 
The Model
Consider a small, open, overlapping-generations economy that operates in a perfectly competitive world and faces a given world interest rate. Time is infinite and discrete.
Production
In every period the economy produces a single good that can be used for either consumption or investment. Two factors of production exist in the economy: physical capital and efficiency units of labor. The production function satisfies the neo-classical assumptions and given by:
where K t and L t are the period t amounts of physical capital and labor efficiency units in the economy, respectively, k t ≡ K t /L t and f(k t ) ≡ F(k t , 1). Given these assumptions the firms' inverse demand for capital is the function:
where r is the world interest rate. From (2) it follows that:
Since F(K t , L t ) satisfies the neo-classical assumptions it also holds that the return to one efficiency unit of labor satisfies:
(4)
Individuals
In each period t a generation of individuals is born and lives for three periods. Each individual has a single parent. Individuals within a generation are identical in their preferences. A generation born at a certain period t-1 is denoted "generation t". In eac period each individual is endowed with a single time unit
In their first life period (t-1), the members of generation t are children. The parent of each child allocates a fraction denoted by τ t-1 of the child's time to schooling.
Each schooling unit costs h output units. 6 As was discussed in the introduction, an important part of the schooling costs spring from secondary schooling tuition, which is government financed in most countries during the past few decades, and the forgone earnings of uneducated young individuals. Thus, not assuming that the cost of a unit of education increases with the growth in incomes [as done for example by Dahan and Tsidon (1998) , or by Maoz and Moav (1999) ] is merely a weak simplification. A version of the current paper where the price of education is an increasing concave function of adults' income yields the same qualitative results and available from author.
In their second life period (t), the members of generation t are adults. They work, have children and save. Each such individual divides this time unit between rearing children and working. The amount of efficiency units each of them has is denoted e t and is an increasing function of the amount of schooling this individual has received as a child. Specifically:
where b > 0. Thus if a member of generation t allocates her entire period t time to working she will earn the amount I t , given by:
(6) I t = e t w = (1 + bτ t-1 )w.
In their final life period (t + 1), the members of generation t consume their savings.
Individuals derive utility from consumption, from the number of children they have and from the potential future income of their children (namely I t+1 ). The preferences of each member of generation t are given by:
where n t denotes the number of children each member of generation t has. Rearing children cost the fraction z of each adult's time. Thus, each member of generation t works in period t for 1 -zn t time units, implying that n t must be constrained to being less than 1/z. The resulting constraint on the consumption of a generation t individual whose potential income is I t is: Note that the term in the square brackets is the income this generation t individual acquires in period t: its first term is the income this individual receives from her work while the second term is the cost of acquiring τ t time units of schooling for n t children.
Optimization
Each member of generation t decides how many children (n t ) to have and how much schooling (τ t ) to give to each of these children so as to maximize the utility function given in (7), given her potential income, I t , and subject to (5), (6), (8), 0 ≤ n t < 1/z and 0 ≤ τ t ≤ 1. In order to avoid some undesired solutions to the optimization problem several assumptions shall be now taken. Given these assumptions, the optimal solution for τ t and n t is: Assumption 1, together with I t > w and Assumption 2 ensure that τ t and n t are strictly positive. Also note that τ t is increasing in I t and that n t is decreasing in I t .
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Assumption 3 ensures that I * > w, implying that the economy can indeed be in the range I t < I * . Showing that n t < 1/z holds when I t > I * is trivial. To see that n t < 1/z holds also when I t < I * note that:
where the second inequality follows from Assumption 1. This leads to:
where the left inequality follows from n t being decreasing in I t and from I t > I ** .
Dynamics
Applying (6) in (9) and simplifying, yields the following dynamical system:
Note that in the range 0 < τ t-1 < τ * the slope of this dynamical function exceeds unity since z > z * and β > γ. The intercept of this dynamical function is between zero and unity due to z * < z < z ** . In addition, note that τ * < 1, due to z * < z < z ** . The economic meaning of these results follows directly from the economic meaning of assumption 1 to 3 discussed in section 3.3. In addition, it follows from these results that the dynamical system has a unique and stable steady state equilibrium at τ = 1. Figure 2 shows this system.
The value of n in this steady state equilibrium, denoted n , is given by the lower row of (10).
7 Note that τ t is independent of α. This is not an important result but merely a by-product of the simplifying assumptions of a log-linear utility function and a time cost that is linear in n t . τ are both below unity, as was shown in subsection 3.4. It follows from (9) that in that range τ t is increasing in γ. Thus,
In periods later than t = 1 the schooling and income differences in favor of country B widen because in those periods the income effect is added to the preferences effect on schooling. This is captured by the result that the slope of the dynamical function exceeds unity and limited to the stage where τ t-1 < τ * .
To study the dynamics of fertility during the stage where τ t-1 < τ * it is useful to present the formula for n t in the upper raw of (10) as the multiplication of two factors.
The first one, the fraction in the left side, shall be referred to as the "preferences factor", since it merely depends on the parameters of the utility function, and since these parameters do not appear in the second factor, the fraction in the right side. This second factor shall be therefore referred to as the "constraints factor". The preferences factor is positive since β > γ and also increasing in α, as follows from standard differentiation bearing in mind that dγ/dα = -1. The constraints factor is positive and decreasing in I t . Therefore,
B t
A t n n > already in period 1, since α A > α B and despite the assumption that the parental incomes are the same in these economies in that period. In later periods the fertility gap,
A t n n − , increases as the effect of the increasing income gap on the constraints factor is added to the preferences effect.
At a certain period country B reaches its steady state equilibrium while country A is still growing. At this stage, the income gap, and therefore the fertility gap too, narrows. Eventually country A too approaches its steady state equilibrium. At this final stage schooling is at its maximal level, τ = 1, in both countries and incomes are therefore identical too. Thus the fertility difference in the steady state depends only on the relative magnitude of β, with respect to α. Country A has therefore a lower value of β, relative to its α, and therefore lower steady state fertility. This can be seen by noticing from the lower raw in (10) that the level of steady state fertility, n , is decreasing in α.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have shown that if the individuals in country A have a stronger preference for consumption over rearing children, compared to the individuals in country B, then the following dynamics might arise: A's growth of output per capita would be slower than B's; Initially, the fertility rates in A would be higher than in B;
Later, as the output gap narrows, the fertility rate in A is lower than the fertility rate in B. Thus, based on this analysis, it is possible that the same reason for third world countries to have higher fertility today is the same one that would make them have lower fertility than the currently already developed economies, once a sufficient level of income convergence would be reached .
The difference between countries in individual utility parameters is taken in this paper as given. The important task of accounting for such differences, for exampleby presenting them as norms and convention that rose endogenously in the past and persist onwards to the time of the fertility dynamics upon which the paper focuses, is beyond the scope of this paper.
For generating growth speed differences between economies I have assumed that individuals derive utility not merely from consumption and child quantity, but also from child quality, and that investment in child quality is the source of growth in these economies. Thus, the stronger taste for consumption in A made its growth slower, compared to B. An alternative mechanism that generates such output and fertility dynamics can be based on having investment in physical capital or in research and development as the source of growth. In such a model, assuming that the individuals in A have a stronger preference for present over future consumption, compared to individuals in B, would generate similar qualitative dynamics. Such modeling, however, would severely limit the ability to go beyond a steady state analysis and efficiently analyze the dynamic path towards the steady state, as the phenomena this paper addresses requires. 
